INTRODUCTION
Congress passed the Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 1994 ("DPPA") in response to state sales of personal information contained in motor vehicle records to individuals and to direct marketing com panies who use it to identify select groups of prospective customers for particular products.1 Thirty-four states sell their department of motor vehicles ("DMV") records to individual citizens and to direct market ers, essentially allowing their unregulated distribution to any party seeking them.2 This practice of selling and distributing personal in formation has serious implications for the privacy and safety of indi vidual citizens.3
In considering the DPP A, Congress dwelt in particular on the use of DMV information by murderers, robbers, and stalkers to identify their victims.4 In California, a man who had hired a private detective to obtain the address of actress Rebecca Shaeffer from the state department of motor vehicles brutally murdered her in the doorway of her Los Angeles apartment.5 Another California resident copied * Thanks to Professors Donald Regan and Roderick Hills for their last-minute com ments and critique. I take full responsibility for the content of this piece.
1. Driver's Privacy Protection Act ("DPPA ") of 1994, 18 U. S.C.A. § § 2721-2725 (West Supp. 1998). Personal information collected by state motor vehicle departments {DMVs) down the license plate numbers of five young women and sent them threatening letters after obtaining their home addresses from the California DMV.6 Anti-abortion groups have long used license plate numbers of cars parked in front of abortion clinics to track down and harass women seeking abortions by obtaining their addresses from DMV records.7
The abandon with which DMVs sell the complete contents of their records on registered drivers to national marketing companies is equally disconcerting. These national marketers specialize in identi fying the overweight, divorced, wealthy, or short in stature in order to assist enterprises eager to target the consumer base most responsive to their form of solicitation.8 Because the compilation, analysis, and dis tribution of such information is in fact an important national industry, accounting for five percent of U.S. employment and $350 billion in annual revenue,9 the regulation of that industry is an area of immedi ate national concem.10
The DPPA regulates the distribution of DMV personal informa tion by placing a prohibition both on state and individual activities. First, the Act prohibits states from freely releasing personal informa tion from state DMV records.11 It then enumerates the conditions un der which states may continue to distribute DMV information -if they choose not to abandon the field to federal control -and limits 6. See id.
7. See id. at 29,469 (statement of Sen. Robb).
8. See Mill er, supra note 2.
9. See Tye, supra note 2. In describing the burgeoning direct marketing industry, Tye notes:
Id.
[A]s marketing in America becomes more and more targeted, more and more people are wondering whether it's an unacceptable invasion of privacy ... [a] nd whether the old system of self-regulation makes sense for a direct marketing industry that, according to a [Direct Marketing Association]-sponsored analysis of everything from advertising to computer services, accounts for 5 percent of US employment and $350 billion in ann tiill revenues.
10. Editor and author Anne Fadiman recently commented on the mass marketing del uge of the information age in Ex Libris: Confessions of a Common Reader. Ms. Fadiman notes, in her chapter entitled "The Catalogical Imperative":
I have never actually solicited a catalogue. Although it is tempting to conclude that our mailbox hatches them by spontaneous generation, I know they are really the offspring of promiscuous mailing lists, which copulate in secret and for money. One of the ... horrors of the direct mail business is that you never know to whom your name will be pandered.
ANNE FADIMAN, Ex LIBRIS: CONFESSIONS OF A COMMON READER 114 {1998); see also infra Part I for a discussion of the constitutionality of federal regulation of the distribution of DMV records under the Commerce Clause.
11. Part (a) of the statute provides: " [A] State department of motor vehicles, and any officer, employee, or contractor, thereof, shall not knowingly disclose or ofuerwise make available to any person or entity personal information about any individual obtained by the department in connection wifu a motor vehicle record. " Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C.A. § 272l{a) (West Supp. 1998). [Vol. 98:514 the redistribution of that information by authorized individuals who obtain it from the DMV.12 The state may opt out of the regulatory scheme entirely by placing a notice on all of its official forms indicat ing that personal information collected may be freely disclosed and providing the opportunity for any registrant to prohibit such disclo sure. 13 Three of the four district courts that have considered challenges to the DPPA have held the law unconstitutional, although two of those 12. The permissible uses are enumerated in part {b) of section 2721 as follows: {l) For use by any government agency, including any court or law enforcement agency, in carryin g out its functions ..•.
(2) For use in connection with matters of motor vehicle or driver safety and theft •••• (3) For use in the normal course of business by a legitimate business or its agents, employ ees, or contractors, but only-(A) to verify the accuracy of personal information submitted by the individual ... and (B) if such information as so submitted is not correct or is no longer correct, to obtain the correct information, but only for the purposes of preventing fraud by, pursuing legal remedies against, or recovering on a debt or security interest against, the individual. For any other use specifically authorized under the law of the State that holds the rec· ord, if such use is related to the operation of a motor vehicle or public safety. 18 U.S.C. §2721(b.). The law goes on to limit the resale or redisclosure of personal informa· tion obtained from DMV records by "authorized recipients " as follows:
An authorized recipient of personal information •.
• may resell or redisclose the information only for a use permitted under subsection (b) (but not for uses under subsection (b)(ll) or (12)) ..•• Any authorized recipient (except a recipient under subsection (b)(ll)) that resells or rediscloses personal information covered by this title must keep for a period of 5 years re cords identifying each person or entity that receives information and the permitted purpose for which the information will be used and must make such records available to the motor vehicle department upon request. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2721(c).
13. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 272l(b){ll) (quoted supra note 12). three were reversed on appeal.14 At both the district and appellate court levels, dispute over the Act focuses not on whether it falls within Congress's Article I commerce power, but rather on the question of whether the Act impermissibly regulates the states in violation of the limitations on federal power imposed by the Tenth Amendment.15 Al though the Supreme Court has established that the two inquiries are, in theory, two sides of the same coin,16 courts have often treated them independently.17
The first inquiry deserves more serious attention than courts evaluating the DPPA have given it. Under modem Commerce Clause jurisprudence, which posits relatedness to the interstate exchange of goods and services as the touchstone for the federal commerce power,18 the DPPA seems a valid exercise of congressional authority. Under a more functional, less formalistic view of the Commerce Clause proposed by Professor Donald Regan, the question of whether the DPPA passes muster is less clear-cut. This view of the Commerce Clause extends federal power only to areas of concern to the nation as a nation, that the states are not competent to regulate independently.19 The DPPA may address such an issue. The second inquiry, like the first, is concerned with whether the federal government is using the 17. See, e.g. , New York, 505 U. S. at 160. The New York Court struck down a provision of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act requiring states either to regulate �aste dis posal according to federal standards or to take title to radioactive waste produced within their borders. Although the regulation of radioactive waste disposal at issue in New York clearly fell within Congress's interstate commerce power, the Court struck down the "take title" provision of the Act on Tenth Amendment grounds.
18. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U. S. 549 (1995) (holding that the Gun-Free School Zone Act is not within the federal commerce power because it is too remote from commerce both in character and purpose).
19. See Donald H. Regan, How to Think About the Fe deral Commerce Power and Inci dentally Rewrite United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 554, 580-81 (1995) (arguing that the only viable alternative to the accretion of unworkable formalisms within Commerce Clause jurisprudence is an approach that focuses on whether a federal law enacted under the commerce power in fact seeks to achieve a national interest that could not be achieved by the separate states). [Vol. 98:514 states to accomplish a federal objective that is beyond its enumerated powers. In pursuing this Tenth Amendment inquiry, however, the Court has been primarily concerned with the mode of regulation rather than whether a federal law regulates an appropriate domain. The Court in New York v. Un ited States struck down the "take-title" provision of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act on the grounds that it "commandeered" state legislatures to develop a feder ally prescribed regulatory program, while recognizing that the domain of regulation was within federal power.20 The Court expanded on this anti-commandeering rule in Printz v. Un ited States, holding that the federal government could not circumvent the rule simply by com manding state officers rather than the state itself.21 The Court found that laws that commandeer the states violate the Tenth Amendment and fundamental federalist principles by allowing the federal govern ment to operate indirectly through the states, thereby avoiding finan cial and political responsibility for federal policies.22
The two circuit courts that have held the DPPA unconstitutional found that the burden of compliance upon states violates the anti commandeering precedent laid down by New York and Printz.13 In holding the DPPA unconstitutional, these courts state that the DPPA conscripts state officers into federal service by requiring them to be come familiar with and implement new standards for the release of DMV information.24 One district court has also based its decision to enjoin the law's application on the burdensome fines it imposes on noncompliant states.25 Confusion over the relationship between the Garcia and New York-Printz lines of cases is a central feature of the disagreement over the constitutionality of the DPPA. The New York Court characterizes the laws at issue in the Garcia line of cases -laws the Court describes as "generally applicable," because they subject states to the same leg islation applicable to private parties -as posing no problem for its anti-commandeering principle.34 In addition, the New York and Printz Courts acknowledge that federal laws that preempt state regulation, or conditionally preempt it by allowing states to choose between preemp tion and implementation of federal regulations, also escape the prob lems posed by commandeering.35 The Courts stop short, however, of explicitly recognizing that laws of general applicability usually operate in a preemptive mode.36 This Note draws the connection between generally applicable laws and the mode of conditional preemption, ar guing that both are constitutionally unproblematic because they tend to preserve the fundamental federalist principle of political account ability. By providing a unifying federalist explanation for the privi leged place given to laws of general applicability and conditional pre emption, this Note lends coherence to the strands of Tenth Amendment jurisprudence.
This Note argues for the constitutionality of the DPPA, first en gaging the threshold question of whether the law falls within the fed eral commerce power and then considering whether its legislative mode is permissible in light of Tenth Amendment jurisprudence. Part I argues that the DPP A is properly within the reach of Congress's commerce power. Part II lays the groundwork for the Tenth Amend ment examination of the DPP A's legislative mode, by establishing the relation of general applicability to commandeering and preemption in a federalism context. Part ill argues that the DPP A takes the form of conditional preemption rather than impermissible commandeering; hence, it should survive the second part of the constitutional analysis.
I.
EVALUATING THE DPPA AS AN EXERCISE OF FEDERAL PREEMPTION UNDER THE COMME RCE CLAUSE Congress's longstanding power to preempt state law within a field subject to national control is not subject to dispute.37 The preemptive mode of federal infringement on the states' exercise of power must, however, be limited to areas in which the Constitution explicitly grants federal control. 38 Otherwise, the national government would cease to be a government of enumerated powers.
An assessment of whether the DPP A is constitutional relies on the determination of whether the national sale of state DMV information falls within the federal government's enumerated powers, specifically the commerce power. Section I.A demonstrates that the DPPA falls within the formalistic definition of the commerce power presented by recent Supreme Court Commerce Clause jurisprudence as embodied in Un ited States v. Lopez. 39 Section I.B offers a more functional ap proach to defining the limits of the commerce power and argues that the DPPA may also pass muster under this analysis. To determine the constitutionality of the DPP A, one must answer the threshold question of whether it regulates a domain that falls within Congress's commerce power as enumerated in Article I, Sec tion 8.40 This threshold determination is a necessary prerequisite to justifying the mode of conditional preemption that the law takes. 41 Historically, the Court has tended towards a kind of Commerce Clause analysis that looks only for characteristics of commerce with- out considering the overarching purpose of a law or whether federal intervention is necessary to accomplish that purpose.4 2 That analysis has alternately produced excessively narrow and overbroad versions of the federal commerce power.4 3 The latter interpretation is exempli fied in the Supreme Court's 1941 decision in Un ited States v. Darby.44
In Darby, the Court held that Congress had power to prohibit the in terstate shipment of lumber manufactured by employees whose working conditions violated the Fair Labor Standards Act because the commerce power "extends to those activities intrastate which so affect interstate commerce ... as to make regulation of them appropriate."4 5 In contrast, several cases of the same period employed commerce fetishizing formalisms to restrict the scope of the Commerce Clause, either by excluding manufacturing from federal regulation as not comprehended in "commerce,"4 6 or by excluding from federal control activities that have only an indirect influence on commerce between the States.4 7 For more than half a century before Lopez, however, the trend had been towards an expansive view of the scope of the federal commerce power.4 8
Although the Court attempted to narrow the potential expansive ness of its approach by striking down the Gun-Free School Zone Act in Lopez, it relied on formalisms that have periodically plagued its ap plication of the Commerce Clause.4 9 Hence, the Court held that an act prohibiting possession of a gun within 500 feet of a school zone over reached the federal government's commerce power, because the law's 46. See, e.g. , Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (holding that the co=erce power did not authorize the regulation of bituminous coal production because production precedes co=erce); United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895) (holding that fed eral antitrust laws did not reach a conspiracy among sugar producers because manufacture is not co=erce).
47. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (holding that a federal law setting minimum wage and maximum hours for slaughterhouse workers went beyond the government's co=erce power because the regulation had only an "indi rect'' effect on interstate co=erce ).
48. See McJohn, supra note 43, at 1.
49. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 580 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("As the Chief Justice explains ... neither the actors nor their conduct has a co=ercial charac ter, and neither the purposes nor the design of the statute has an evident co=ercial nexus."); cf. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp., 295 U.S. at 550; E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. at 16. effect on and relatedness to "interstate commerce" were too remote to fall within the reach of the Commerce Clause.50
The Court's analysis in Lopez nevertheless expresses the current state of the inquiry into the scope of the commerce power. Under this analysis the DPPA clearly passes muster, since it regulates a national market in information, involving the movement of DMV records con taining personal information on all of a state's licensed drivers across state lines.51 Because the distribution of DMV records is an interstate activity that enables the national exchange of personal information, the Commerce Clause empowers the federal government to regulate that activity.
B. Is the DPPA Valid Un der a Fu nctional App roach to the Commerce Clause?
Not only does the DPPA fall within the Commerce Clause ac cording to the formalistic analysis used in Lopez, but it also satisfies the more comprehensive requirements of a functional approach. Be cause the Lopez Court limited its inquiry to indicators of "interstate commerce" and failed to consider whether the purpose of the federal law was a nationally important one that could not be competently achieved by independent state regulation, it failed to provide a solid analytical framework for Commerce Clause doctrine.52 By focusing commerce clause analysis on the degree of relatedness of a regulated activity to the movement of goods, data, or people across state lines, 50. See Lopez, 514 U. S. at 551 ("The Act neither regulates a commercial activity nor contains a requirement that the possession be connected in any way to interstate com merce. ").
51
. A "good " that both moves in interstate commerce and is essential to facilitating in terstate commerce -like the personal information from DMV records sold to mass market ers nationwide and used by them to reach national consumers -would be an "instrumen tality" of interstate commerce and hence within the federal commerce power. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59 ("First, Congress may regulate the use of the channels of interstate com merce. . . . Second, Congress is empowered to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, even though the threat may come only from intrastate activities .. .. Finally, Congress' commerce authority includes the power to regulate those activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce, i.e., those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce. " (citations omitted)).
52 See Lopez, 514 U. S. at 567 ("The possession of a gun in a local school zone is in no sense an economic activity that might ... substantially affect any sort of interstate com merce .. .. [T] here is no indication that [Respondent] had recently moved in interstate com merce, and there is no requirement [in the Act] that his possession of the firearm have any concrete tie to interstate commerce."); see also Regan, supra note 19, at 555 (noting that, although the outcome of Lopez is probably correct, the Court's analysis is "unsatisfactory "). The formalistic quality of the Lopez Court's analytical framework is exposed by the amendment to the Gun-Free School Zone Act made following the Lopez decision in order to render the Jaw constitutional within the Lopez guidelines. The law was amended to pro hibit the possession within 500 feet of a school zone of any gun that has traveled in interstate commerce. See 18 U. S. C. A. § 922( q)(2)( A) (West Supp. 1999).
the Court ignored the constitutionally significant question of whether a law has a nationally important purpose requiring federal implemen tation.s3
A more substantive, functional analysis, advocated in the work of Professor Regan, would take account of the particular institutional structure of our government to address the question of whether a uni form federal regulation is necessary to effect a purpose of genuine na tional interest.54 The Commerce Clause grants the federal government legislative power to pursue such an interest, important to the nation as a nation and which the states are separately incompetent, or not moti vated, to achieve.ss If a domain proves to be within the federal com merce power so understood, then it is by definition suited to the legis lative mode of preemption.
The DPP A, in regulating the distribution of personal information by state DMVs to mass marketers and others, implicates interstate communication and transportation, issues of genuine national inter est.s6 Applying Regan's definition of national interest as an interest that concerns the nation as a nation, the best argument in support of restricting distribution of DMV information in the national interest is that such restrictions reduce the potential danger associated with ob taining a license.s7 Reducing this danger decreases a burden placed upon interstate travel; individuals will not be forced to choose be tween securing their personal information and obtaining a license.
53. See Regan, supra note 19, at 570-71.
54. See id. at 569, 571 (arguing that federal regulation is not appropriate to address the problem of gun possession near schools at issue in Lopez because " [t] here is nothing in the background of the [Gun-Free School Zones Act] to suggest that states are less capable of dealing with the problem ... than the federal government; nor is there anything to suggest the states are inadequately motivated to do so "). 56. See supra notes 2-10 and accompanying text; see also Regan, supra note 19, at 571-73. Regan recognizes "transportation and communication " as "general interests of the un ion." Id. at 571.
57. According to Regan, a "genuine interest of the nation " is more than merely an in terest that concerns all states in the nation. Rather, it is an interest that particularly impli cates the national identity and the states' ability to operate as a nation. The assessment of what constitutes a genuine national interest is in the first instance for Congress to make, not the courts. See Regan, supra note 19, at 567-73, 579-81. Although Congress has raised safety concerns regarding the distribution of DMV information, see supra text accompanying notes 4-7, it has not explicitly identified that threat as a threat to national transportation, and thus, _Regan would not necessarily identify the regulation of DMV information as a genuine na tional interest.
The second question in determining whether the domain of DMV information distribution falls within the commerce power is whether the federal government is in fact more competent or more motivated than the separate states to protect the national interest effectively. On the one hand, pressure from a state's citizens concerned with privacy and safety may be a powerful motivating factor that would encourage the states, independently, to take the necessary measures to limit the distribution of the citizens' personal information. Certainly the re sources necessary for regulation of the distribution of DMV informa tion are as readily available to states as to the federal government. While both are competent to regulate, however, the states, unlike the federal government, are faced with the disincentive presented by the prospect of severely limiting the revenues they draw from the un regulated distribution of their DMV records.58 That pecuniary motiva tion to ignore or subvert the general privacy and safety interests of the people suffices to tip the balance in favor of federal regulation.59 Therefore, while both the federal and state governments are compe tent to regulate the distribution of DMV records, the states may lack the regulatory motivation necessary to ensure the protection of na tional safety and privacy interests.
Because the DPPA is within the federal government's enumerated power under the Commerce Clause, under the formalistic approach of Lopez and perhaps under the functional approach advocated by re cent scholarship, the mode of preemption is proper to federal regula tion of the distribution of DMV records. Moreover, the law addresses an issue potentially of national concern, one that the states independ ently are disinclined to adequately address due to the financial disin centives posed by limiting the sale of DMV records.
Having survived the threshold Commerce Clause inquiry, the DPPA must also endure the second prong of the constitutionality test -that is, whether the mode of the law is compatible with the Tenth It should be noted that a state policy respecting privacy by closing state motor vehicle records might conceivably have the benefit of attracting more residents to the state and thereby increasing the state's tax base. The countervailing power of this benefit, however, is difficult to assess and somewhat farfetched by comparison with the concrete loss of revenues that would immediately result from the cessation of the sale of DMV records.
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Amendment: The origin of the focus on legislative mode, of primary concern to the New York and Printz Courts, may be traced to the Court's earlier decision in Garcia. By doing away with the judicial cataloguing of "traditional government functions"60 relegated to state sovereign control, Garcia paved the way for New York's and Printz's focus on the mode of regulation of the laws under scrutiny.61
The relationship between the Court's decision in Garcia and the Court's later decisions in New York and Printz is complicated, both by Garcia's inattention to the Tenth Amendment as a limitation on fed eral authority and by New York's apparent marginalization of cases in the Garcia line. First, Garcia proposes that state participation in the political process is a sufficient limitation on federal overreaching,62 while New York and Printz strongly reassert the role of the Tenth Amendment in constraining the manner in which the federal govern ment exercises its constitutional authority.63 Second, and equally vex ing for the development of a coherent Tenth Amendment jurispru dence, the New York Court summ arily treats the Garcia line of cases as concerned with laws of general applicability.64 This characterization of the Garcia line, absent any explanation of its ramifications for fed eralism, has been a primary source of confusion for courts in consid ering the DPPA's constitutionality. In short, courts have been uncer tain about the scope and meaning of Garcia in the wake of New York.65
Part TI parses the federalism implications of general applicability by exploring its relation to the legislative modes of commandeering on the one hand and conditional preemption on the other. Section TI
A. Garcia Set the Stage for New York and Printz
The Court in Garcia held constitutional the provision of the Fair Labor Standards Act imposing maximum hour/minimum wage re quirements on state employers, thereby rejecting the blanket prohibi tion on the regulation of "States as States" established in National League of Cities.6(, The Garcia Court rejected the traditional govern ment function test because it offered no coherent basis for identifying what these most fundamental elements of state sovereignty were.67 Moreover, the Court found that this "traditional function"-finding en deavor, relying on a rigid, a priori definition of state sovereignty, was fundamentally incompatible with the dynamic role of federalism in a 
taking this radical stance, which propelled Tenth Amend ment jurisprudence out of the "traditional government function" rut and hence beyond its unhelpful focus on demarcating the "what" of state sovereignty as the primary means of precluding federal en croachment.69 In so doing, Garcia enabled the New York and Printz Courts to treat how federal regulation functions as a source of impor tant limitations on the federal government's exercise of its constitu tional authority under the Tenth Amendment.
The New York and Printz Courts go beyond Garcia in their under standing of the means by which the principal federalism concerns of political accountability and prevention of tyranny must be protected. Presuming the federal political process sufficient to preserve the bal ance of power between state and federal government, the Garcia Court concluded that "[s]tate sovereign interests ... are more prop erly protected by procedural safeguards inherent in the structure of the federal system than by judicially crafted limitations on federal power."70 Printz and New York, on the other hand, clearly establish that, regardless of the political process by which laws are engendered, federal regulation that operates by commandeering the states violates the limitations on federal power implicit in the Tenth Amendment.71 Still , New York and Printz were able to construct this new analytical 68. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 545-46; see also Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and Principle?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2180, 2212-13, 2228, 2240 (1998) (discussing the tension between principled constitutional adjudication and the de mands of flexible federalism and arguing for process·based, clear evidence requirements that focus on the source of federal power and need for federal action); Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism fo r a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 12-14, 36 (1988) (rejecting National League of Cities' "traditional governmental func tion" basis for limiting the federal commerce power and arguing that the constitutional guarantee of a republican form of government produces a more workable concept of fe der alism); Rapaczynski, supra note 61, at 359-68. Rapaczynski, following the Garcia Court, re jects the language of dual sovereignty employed by the Court and scholars in attempting to clarify the tension between state and federal power that underpins the federalist structure of our government. The fiction of a rigid divide is exposed by Garcia's conclusion that process may be the primary means of identifying appropriate exercises of state and fe deral power. Id. at 351-52, 356-57, 359-60. Rapaczynski notes that "the traditional concept of sovereignty simply obfuscates the fact that actual authority in the modem states resides in an often shifting configuration of political, economic, and social groups, with the state being only one of the contenders." Id. at 359 n.50.
69. See Merritt, supra note 68, at 15 (noting the radical character of Garcia); Rapaczyn· ski, supra note 61, at 372-73. Rapaczynski argues that Garcia's reliance on the political pro· cess to tend the federalist balance of power does not exclude the imposition of real limita tions on the federal government's exercise of its legislative authority .. Rather, Garcia 's emphasis on the political process recognizes that substantive limits can only be meaningful if informed by a complex account of the nature of federalist institutions. Id. framework for Tenth Amendment analysis based on legislative mode because Garcia razed the "traditional government function" edifice of Tenth Amendment jurisprudence that had stood in its place.
70.

B. Fe deralism Imp lications of General App licability
Without challenging the validity of Garcia, the New York Court sidestepped the Garcia line of cases by identifying them as concerned with laws of "general applicability," that is, laws that apply to both states and private parties.72 Although the New York Court uses the term "laws of general applicability" as a term of art, the phrase used as such occurs nowhere in Garcia or the cases generally associated with it. To the degree that the concept is present in cases of the Garcia line, it is important solely as an indicator that the laws at issue do not seek to dominate the states in their sovereign relation to their citi zens.73 Nevertheless, the New York Court stated that the challenge to the "take-title" provision of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act "presents no occasion to apply or revisit the holdings of any of these cases, as this is not a case in which Congress has subj ected a State to the same legislation applicable to private parties."74 The Court's distinction between federal laws that apply only to states and generally applicable laws that apply to both state and private activities, however, offers only a superficial basis for the constitutionality of a law under the Tenth Amendment. 75 The concern posed by laws that apply to the states but not private parties is that the federal government may use such legislation to regulate private parties indirectly without accepting the political and economic burden such regulation entails. poses a serious threat to the federalist principle of prevention of tyr anny through political accountability.77 Problems of accountability arise if voters mistakenly hold state officers responsible for actions those officers were forced to take under federal law, or if voters fail to hold the federal government responsible for imposing certain choices and costs on the states.78 Moreover, federal lawmakers will hold them selves less responsible to voters if they find ways to direct states to carry out federally prescribed programs.79 A federal law that seeks to impose the same constraints on both states and private parties is by definition not an instance of the federal government evading direct regulation of private conduct, and so it does not pose this threat to federalist values associated with commandeering.80 In short, general applicability is one indication that a law does not interfere with the balance of state and federal power in this way. 81 This notion of general applicability may also be a throwback to the ultimately unworkable "traditional government function" test pro pounded by National League of Cities and rejected by Garcia.152 To the degree that a statute is designed to regulate the activity of both states By forcing state governments to absorb the financial burden of implementing a federal regulatory program, Members of Congress can take credit for "solving" problems without having to ask their constituents to pay for the solutions with higher federal taxes. And even when the States are not forced to absorb the costs ... they are still put in the position of taking the blame for its burdensomeness and for its defects. 78. See Jackson, supra note 68, at 2201.
See id.
80. This is not to say that laws of general applicability, which operate predominantly in a preemptive mode, see infra Section II.B.1, are entirely free from accountability confusion. As Jackson notes, a certain level of confusion regarding public accountability inheres in the federalist structure established by the Constitution: "[A] federal system necessarily results in a more confusing situation for voters than does a unitary, centralized government. Stan dard preemption -the effect of federal law in negating the area in which state Jaw can op erate -can obscure the causes of inaction by state officials." Jackson, supra note 68, at 2201-02 {footnote omitted).
It should be noted that conditional preemption in some sense reduces this problem, in that it allows states to choose between implementation of federal standards and preemption in a field in which state activity affects the national welfare, a choice for which state citizens may justly hold the state, rather than the federal government, accountable. [T] he purpose of drawing a distinction between laws of general applicability and laws directed exclusively at states is not to suggest that the former are always constitutional and the latter are always unconstitutional .... Rather, the distinction is one indication how much a congressional enactment upsets tile structural balance between fe deral and state sovereignty, if at all.").
82 See supra notes 29, 67-68 and accompanying text; Jackson, supra note 68, at 22rt7. As Jackson points out, tllere is no doubt tllat tile Printz Court remained mired to some ex tent in an arguably outdated "separate spheres" model of dual sovereignty. See id. at 2206. and private individuals, it is less likely to be encroaching on an area of uniquely governmental function, as such functions will tend to be car ried out by states rather than individuals.83 The fact that an activity is carried out only by the states, however, is but one indicator that it may not fall within reach of federal regulatory power; that indicator is not in itself sufficient to render federal regulation of that activity per se unconstitutional.
Because of the New York Court's failure to explain why generally applicable laws do not pose fe deralism problems, the Court's passing identification of the laws at issue in the Garcia line of cases as such has proven confusing to courts in evaluating the DPP A. For example, the Fourth Circuit, in Condon v. Reno, affirm ed the lower court holding that the DPPA was unconstitutional on the grounds that it is not a law that applies equally to states and individuals.84 The Fourth Circuit ap parently concluded, from New York's and Printz's characterizations of the Garcia line of cases as concerned with laws of general applicabil ity, that federal laws regulating states as states would only be permis sible under the Tenth Amendment if they applied to both state and private parties. This reasoning is formalistic in that it fails to take ac count of the basis on which generally applicable laws are deemed to preserve federalist values.
The mere fact that the DPPA does not take the form of a law of general applicability does not conclude the inquiry info its constitu tionality. For the same reasons that generally applicable laws tend to be unproblematic for fe deralism, laws taking the form of conditional preemption are equally so. New York and Printz distinguish permissi ble conditional preemption from impermissible commandeering with out making explicit the analytical connection between generally appli cable laws and preemptive ones. 85 After articulating its anti commandeering rule, the New York Court simply asserts that "[t]he Constitution instead gives Congress the authority to regulate matters directly and to pre-empt contrary state regulation."86 This distinction between commandeering and preemption cuts closer to the quick of the federalist problem of separating efficacious exercises of federal authority that do not compromise federalist values, from federal over reaching that undermines a state's ability to be politically responsible to its citizens.
Section II.B.1 examines South Ca rolina v. Baker as an instance of a case in the Garcia line that, in addition to fitting the descriptive cate gory of general applicability, operates through the mode of condi- [Vol. 98:514 tional preemption. Section II.B.2 argues that the mode of conditional preemption encompasses all laws that offer the states a genuine choice between abandoning a regulatory field and implementing federal re quirements, regardless of whether the field involves regulation of pri vate as well as state activity.
1.
Fr om General App licability to Conditional Preemption:
South Carolina v. Baker
Although the New Yo rk Court explicitly stated that the Garcia line of cases should be applied in evaluating "laws of general applicabil ity," there is no indicator that these are the only cases to which the earlier line of Tenth Amendment jurisprudence should apply.87 Nei ther Garcia itself, nor Baker which followed and elaborated upon it, grounds the decision to uphold federal law in the identification of the law as a "law of general applicability."88 The New York Court's retro spective identification of the laws treated by the Garcia line of cases as "generally applicable" is descriptively accurate; yet, it should not be misconstrued as providing the legal underpinning or the limiting prin ciple on which these decisions were based. 89
The law at issue in Garcia, correctly described by the New Yo rk Court as a law of general applicability, is more precisely characterized for federalism purposes as a law operating in the legislative mode of preemption. The conditions for preemption exist when the state and federal governments have concurrent power \v ithin a particular field of regulation.90 In Garcia, the San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority argued that control of mass-transit was a traditional state function, hence within state control;91 at the same time, prior Court decisions had extended the federal government's commerce power to intrastate activities, like the creation of a mass-transit system, that af fect interstate commerce.92 Hence, the prerequisite concurrent state and federal power was present, making preemption viable. Preemption doctrine dictates that where federal and state laws conflict in.a field of concurrent power, federal law will prevail.93 More broadly, preemption doctrine allows that, even absent a contrary state law, the federal government may take regulatory possession of the field by passing legislation that makes manifest this intent.94 The un doubted constitutionality of the legislative mode of preemption has been grounded most frequently in the Supremacy Clause, and, less commonly, in the Necessary and Proper Clause of the Constitution.95 In other words, the mode of preemption is constitutional by virtue not only of the preeminence of federal law in areas of legitimate federal control, but also of the existence of a national interest that requires that a given field be uniformly regulated according to a single set of rules.96 Setting standards for employee working conditions -for ex ample, environmental regulation -is a field of this kind in which pre emption is appropriate.97
See New
Section 310 of the Internal Revenue Code ("IRC") at issue in South Carolina v. Baker, also generally applicable to both state and private enterprises,98 differs from the law at issue in Garcia in that it operates in a conditionally preemptive mode. The provision of IRC section 310 that was challenged in the case barred ("preempted") the state issuance of unregistered ("bearer") bonds, but allowed the state to continue to issue bonds in compliance with federal registration re quirements.99 The national concern the law sought to address was the use of unregistered bonds as an instrument of tax evasion. 100 That concern was of self-evident national importance101 and probably would have justified complete federal preemption of the field. By making federal occupation of the bond-issuing field conditional on the state's decision not to implement federal requirements, the law departed from standard preemption. The challenged provision was upheld, however, on the grounds that it intervened directly in a state activity rather than commandeering the states to regulate a private activity ac cording to a federal regulatory scheme.102 In other words, it gave the 93. See Gardbaum, supra note 37, at 770. states a choice between preemption in the field of issuing bonds and continuing to be active in the field by bringing its issuing standards into compliance with federal registration requirements.
The Baker Court relied and elaborated upon Garcia's approach to federalist problems, recognizing that compliance with federal preemp tion did not present the difficulties posed by federal commandeering of the states.103 The Court based its analysis on an assessment of the IRC's objectives as well as the mode in which it sought to accomplish them. The Court found that the IRC's regulation of state issuance of bonds did not violate federalist principles; the regulation did not seek to control the manner in which the states regulate private parties, and hence did not unduly interfere with political accountability or the po litical responsiveness of local government to the popular voice.104 Rather, the Court recognized that any federal regulation demands compliance, which may be mischaracterized as "commandeering." 1 0 5
The Baker Court, taking its cues from Garcia, sought to hammer out a more analytical approach to assessing the federalist concerns presented by federal regulation of state activities. Notably, both the New York and Printz decisions recognize preemption of the kind at issue in Baker as a valid exercise of federal power.106
2
Un derstanding the Limits of Conditional Preemption:
New York v. Un ited States
As already noted, it is possible to reconcile the Garcia line of cases with New York and Printz by recognizing the Garcia line as concerned not simply with "laws of general applicability" but, more fundamen tally, with federal laws that preempt contrary state laws. The New York Court's assertion that Congress has the power to preempt state law implies a recognition of the constitutionality of federal laws that offer states a choice between preemption in a given field and continu ing to regulate in accordance with federal requirements. Printz makes this explicit. 1 07 In recognition of the permissibility of conditional pre emption, the Printz Court cited Ho del v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, In c. and Fe deral Energy Regulatory Commission v. Mississipp i ("FER C") as cases that justifiably upheld federal laws be cause compliance with federal standards under these laws was merely "a precondition to continued state regulation of an otherwise pre- note 36, at 917 (arguing that generally applicable laws should be exempted from the per se anti-commandeering rule of New Yo rk "not because they apply to private persons as well as nonfederal officials, but rather because such laws typically have the form of conditional preemption").
110. See, e.g., Condon v. Reno, 155 F.3d 453, 463 n.6 (4th Cir. 1998), cert. granted, 119 S. Ct. 1753 (1999) (citing New Yo rk for the proposition that only where Congress has the power to regulate private parties may it impose laws that take on the form of conditional preemption).
111. See New York, 505 U.S. at 167.
112 See, e.g., Condon, 155 F3d at 463 n.6 ("The dissent contends that the DPP A is con stitutional because Congress could have 'preempted the field of motor vehicle information disclosure.' We disagree. Only 'where Congress has the authority to regulate private activity under the Commerce aa:use ... [may it] offer States the choice of regulating that activity according to federal standards or having state law pre-empted by federal regulation.' "(in ternal reference omitted) (first emphasis added)). which States regulate private parties."115 According to Baker, then, a federal law presenting states with a choice between preemption of a state activity (issuing bonds) and continuation of that activity in com pliance with federal guidelines is entirely constitutional where the con sequences of the state activity fall within Congress's enumerated pow ers.116 In order for New York to be consistent with past Supreme Court precedent, its preemption exception cannot be understood as applying only to fe deral laws that directly regulate private activities.117
Because New York and Prin tz acknowledge the validity of laws operating in a preemptive mode as well as laws of general applicability, these decisions are consistent with such cases of the Garcia line as Baker. Conditional preemption respects the federalist concern for protecting political accountability and responsiveness, while enabling the federal government to intervene where necessary to accomplish a public good within its enumerated powers.U8 This kind of flexibility within the fe deralist structure of our government was deemed essential by Garcia.U9 New York and Printz simply constrain that flexibility by identifying commandeering as a mode of federal legislation that is inconsistent with the Tenth Amendment. These Courts relied on Garcia in shifting the focus of Tenth 11S. South Carolina v. Baker, 48S U.S. SOS, S14 {1988). Section 310 of the IRC actually imposed a tax on income from state and local unregistered bonds. The Baker court assumed that this tax essentially prohibited states from issuing unregistered bonds by making them undesirable. See id. at S11.
116. See id. at S26 {finding that a tax like that imposed by IRC section 310 on interest earned by holders of unregistered bonds in order to effectively prohibit issuance of such bonds, was within the fe deral government's constitutional taxing power). That the choice to comply with federal guidelines might require substantial effort on the part of state legislators and executives did not trouble the Baker court: "Such 'commandeering' is •.. an inevitable consequence of regulating a state activity." Id. at S14.
117. The dissenting judge in the Fourth Circuit's Condon decision, supporting the lower court's finding that the DPPA was unconstitutional, relies on this argument in attempting to reconcile the Garcia line of cases with the Supreme Court's decisions in New York and Printz. See Condon, lSS F.3d at 468 {Phillips, J., dissenting). Judge Phillips asserts that "the legislation at issue in Garcia and Wyoming .
•. was immune to Tenth Amendment challenge not so much -if at all -because they applied equally to state and private actors as because they directly regulated state activities rather than using the 'States as implements of regula tion' of third parties." Id.
118. The New York Court recognized conditional preemption as a mode of federal regulation that, by presenting states with a choice, could preserve the fe deralist values of political accountability and responsiveness:
If state residents would prefer their government to devote its attention and resources to problems other than those deemed important by Congress, they may choose to have the Federal Government rather than the State bear the expense of a federally mandated regula tory program, and they may continue to supplement that program to the extent state law is not pre-empted. New York, SOS U.S. at 168.
119. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at S4S-46.
Amendment analysis beyond the particular activity regulated and towards the manner of regulation.
ill . THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE DPPA:
The New York and Printz Courts recognized the constitutionality of federal preemption of state law, thereby affirmin g the distinction between preemption and impermissible federal commandeering of the states.120 Both Courts reiterated the constitutional viability of federal laws of the former kind, while holding that the laws of the latter type are inherently incompatible with the fundamental principles of feder alism.121 Section III.A argues that the DPPA is constitutional because, unlike the laws at issue in Printz and New York, it exemplifies condi tional preemption rather than commandeering. Section III.B com pares the DPP A to other laws that the Court has held constitutional in several cases in the Garcia line and that present less compelling in stances of conditional preemption than the DPP A.
A. Th e DPPA Ta kes the Constitutionally Permissible Fo rm of
Conditional Preemption
The courts that have failed to recognize the DPP A as an instance of conditional preemption have accordingly not recognized that the law falls outside the anti-commandeering rule established in Printz and New York. The two circuit courts that have held the DPPA un constitutional have obj ected to the benefit the federal government would wring from the states by requiring them to train their own DMV employees to distinguish valid from invalid requests for per- [Vol. 98:514 sonal information under the DPPA requirements.122 Only one circuit court and one district court that have considered the law have recog nized that the Act offers states the alternative of pulling out of the field entirely by simply closing their records to the public.123 While recognizing the preemption alternative afforded by the DPP A, the dis trict court nevertheless dismissed it as insufficient to address the ac countability concerns at the heart of the anti-commandeering rule.124
Laws taking the form of conditional preemption are generally deemed constitutional because they allow the federal government to regulate in areas of particularly national concern without violating fundamental federalist values. Such laws preserve state autonomy by offering states a choice between continuing to regulate in a particular field in accordance with federally prescribed standards or abandoning the field entirely to direct federal control.125 This basic characteristic of choice is more than a formal quality of conditional preemption.
The distinction offered in Printz between permissible federal laws that apply incidentally to the states and impermissible federal laws whose "whole obj ect [is] to direct the functioning of the state execu tive" is consistent with the view of commandeering as something more than mere compliance.126 The federal government is guilty of imper missible commandeering when it could accomplish its particular goal by directly regulating the behavior of private parties but instead chooses to achieve its ends by ordering the states to constrain their citizens in a particular way. In such a case, the problem of political ac countability is obvious, in that the federal government shirks direct imposition on private parties and instead seeks through its legislation to conscript the states into doing its dirty work. Because DMVs are a primary site for the accumulation of personal information about a state's citizens and because individuals are generally not engaged in collecting such information on a state-wide basis, however, the federal government cannot regulate the national market in DMV records by directly regulating private parties. 127 Therefore, the most direct method of accomplishing the DPPA's objective is to target state activ ity.
Unlike the DPPA, the laws at issue in New York and Printz impermissibly sought to dictate the states' regulation of private parties rather than directly regulate state activity or private behavior or both.128 The "take-title" provision of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act under examination in New York interfered with the states' relation to private citizens by requiring the state to take title to the waste produced by in-state private waste producers. The New York Court recognized Congress's right to regulate the conduct of pri vate waste producers directly but objected to the mode of regulation chosen here because it impermissibly commandeered the states to regulate private citizens in a federally prescribed manner.129 Similarly, in Printz, the challenged provision of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act sought to dictate the relation between the state and its citizens by requiring state officers to conduct background checks on prospective handgun purchasers.130 The DPPA, by contrast, accom plishes federal objectives by operating directly on the relevant state activity rather than seeking to reach the conduct of individuals by ma nipulating the states' relation to their citizens.
In exempting laws of general applicability from the prohibition on commandeering, the Printz and New York Courts focused on prohib iting only congressional legislation that accomplishes indirectly an objective that the federal government could as easily accomplish di rectly. This is not to suggest, however, that the only federal laws that do not threaten federalist principles are generally applicable laws.131
Where a federal law seeks to achieve a nationally important objective that falls within the government's enumerated powers and can do so only by regulating states as states, the law cannot be characterized as commandeering.132 In such a case, the obj ect of the law is not to com mandeer the states; rather, the law overrides state policy with the ob ject of protecting a national interest that falls under the federal gov ernment's power to regulate.133 Moreover, state compliance with a demand for federal access to such state information is recognized by Printz and New York as probably too de minimus to qualify as com mandeering of the kind these cases prohibit.134 Hence, it seems likely that implementation of the DPPA would be within the federal gov ernment's institutional capacity.
Although the DPPA fails to articulate a precise federal regulatory mechanism for the distribution of DMV information should states choose to abandon the field entirely by closing their DMV records, it does not misuse preemption as merely an empty threat.135 The fact that a federal law preempting state law fails to specify a regulatory al ternative is not in itself sufficient to render the law unconstitutional.136 The preemption alternative offered by the DPP A is valid because it simply is not a threat but a viable solution to the problem the law is designed to address.137 In this respect, it resembles the prohibition on state issuance of unregistered bonds offered by IRC section 301 and is distinguishable from PURP A's exemption alternative that did nothing to address the national energy crisis. 
Mississippi.
In FERC, the Court upheld a provision of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act ("PURP A"), relying on preemption analysis to justify its decision.139 The federal law at issue in FER C required state regulatory authorities and nonregulated utilities to consider im plementing federal regulatory standards to combat a nationwide en ergy crisis resulting from utilities' unregulated use of natural gas and oil in the generation of electricity.140 It also gave the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission the separate power to exempt energy pro ducers entirely from state regulation.141 The Supreme Court found that occupying the field of public utility regulation in a time of na tional energy crisis was a constitutional exercise of federal preemptive power.142
The FER C Court held the challenged provisions of PURP A constitutional on the grounds that they operated in the permissible mode of conditional preemption.143 The Court analogized PURPA to the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act upheld in Ho del v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass 'n, In c. that gave states the option of either regulating strip mining in compliance with federal than regulated utilities, the preemption of utility regulation does nothing to advance, and might even impede, PURP A's purpose. 142 See id. at 745, 763-64. It is worth noting that the Court appears to limit its recogni tion of the federal government's power to preempt regulation of utilities by specifying pri vate actors: "Congress could have pre-empted the field, at least insofar as private rather than state activity is concerned . ... " Id at 765. The Court's apparent reservation of the question of whether the same regulation was equally unproblematic as applied to state ac tivity must be understood in light of the jurisprudential environment in which FER C was decided. At the time of the decision, Na tional League of Cities, which forbade federal regu lation of states "as states" in areas of "traditional state functions," was still good law. It seems likely that, had FER C been decided after Garcia overturned National League of Cit ies, the Court would not have equivocated on the question whether a federal law regulating state as well as private activity in a field of self-evident national concern could be deemed a valid exercise of Congress's preemption power.
143. See id. at 768 n.30 {describing PURPA as "a scheme that gives the States a choice between regulating in conformity with fe deral requirements, or abandoning regulation in a given field").
environmental protection standards or abandoning the field to the Secretary of the Interior who was charged with implementing a fe deral program.144 The Court found that in the field of energy regulation, as in the field of strip mining regulation, "the Federal Government could have pre-empted all ... regulations; instead, it allowed the States to enter the field if they promulgated regulations consistent with federal standards."145 The Court adjudged PURP A unproblematic for Tenth Amendment purposes because the law operated by conditional preemption, giving states a choice while legitimately seeking to protect a national interest.146 PURP A is a less compelling instance of conditional preemption than the DPPA, however, in that the choice PURPA offers the states is less genuine and, so, more coercive. Because the law fails to provide the possibility of federal regulation of energy producers as an alterna tive in the event of state default, the broad preemption power that the law grants the FERC acts as a fe deral threat of complete deregulation should states refuse to consider federal regulatory standards.147 As such, the preemption provision may act to coerce states into imple menting federal standards rather than providing them with a bona fide choice, since deregulation could in no sense ameliorate the national energy crisis.148 In this respect, PURP A differs significantly from the DPPA. Federal preemption of the field of DMV record distribution by closing state DMV records to the public would clearly address the privacy and safety concerns that motivated the DPPA by keeping the personal information contained in DMV records out of the interstate marketplace. The DPP A's preemption alternative, then, unlike the preemption alternative provided by PURP A, offers a bona fide means of addressing the concern the law was designed to remedy. 148. See Hills , supra note 36, at 921-27. Hills argues that certain "conditions" associated with preemption may be unconstitutional, adding a further constraint to the federal govern ment's use of conditional preemption to exercise control over certain state-regulated fields. Hills sketches a judicial approach to preemption that might identify instances of misuse, "prohibit[ing] conditional preemption of state or local policies whenever (1) the condition that the nonfederal government must meet would, if imposed unconditionally, be unconsti tutional, and (2) Congress threatened preemption of nonfederal policy merely to gain lever age to extract compliance with the condition." Id. at 924. The challenged provisions of PURP A were of the latter kind.
The provision of the Internal Revenue Code at issue in South Carolina v. Baker resembles the DPPA in that it does not have the co ercive potential of PURP A but rather presents the states with a genuine choice. The provisions of the IRC at issue in Baker had as their objective the elimination of "unregistered bonds" that had be come an instrument of tax evasion.149 The Court found that because the issuance of such bonds was of national concern, the federal gov ernment was justified in requiring states to eliminate the undesirable effects of that activity either by turning over the regulatory field to the federal government or complying with federal registration require ments.150 Like the DPPA, then, IRC section 301 was a valid exercise of the federal government's power of conditional preemption in an area of national concern.
Nevertheless, the alternatives presented by IRC section 301 and the DPP A -withdrawal from the field or continued regulation in compliance with federal standards -necessarily demand some legisla tive cooperation from the states, in the form of amendments to or re peal of existing laws.151 The Baker Court saw no coercion or comman deering implicit in the demand for state cooperation.
Rather, recognizing that "[a]ny federal regulation demands compliance," the Baker Court found no constitutional defect in the fact that "a State wishing to engage in certain activity must take administrative and sometimes legislative action to comply with federal standards regu lating that activity."15 2
C ONCLUSION
The DPPA, then, is a constitutional instance of the federal gov ernment's use of conditional preemption to achieve an interest of na tional importance that the separate states are not motivated to achieve independently. By giving states a choice between adopting federal re strictions and withdrawing from the field of regulating DMV informa tion distribution entirely, the federal government is in no sense coerc ing the states into implementing federal regulations. For that reason, the DPP A poses none of the political accountability problems pre sented by laws that commandeer the states. At most, the DPP A al lows the federal government to clear the way for federal regulation in this domain wherever a state chooses preemption over implementa tion of federal requirements. Closing state DMV records to the public 
